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The concept of experimental ancillaries is interesting, but Kalbfleisch (1975) has, in my view, not produced convincing reasons for being unable either to apply S before CE, or to apply CM before S. I am inclined to think that such reasons of principle cannot be found and that the resolution of the dilemma raised by Birnbaum's theorem lies, not in prescribing some fixed sequence of modified versions of C and S, but in accepting that statistical analyses, in general, will not and cannot lead to unequivocal conclusions, and, in particular, that various applications, to the same model and data, of the procedures of margining to a sufficient statistic or of conditioning on an ancillary statistic may lead to different views on the chance mechanism.
It is to be expected that reasoning from different angles about a subject matter on the basis of incomplete information will result in differing answers. Ambiguity of this kind is a difficult but not prohibitive feature of scientific investigations. For instance, there is nothing fatally paradoxical about the general lack of nonuniqueness of maximal ancillaries, as has recently been stressed by Barnard (1974) . Now, Birnbaum's result may be paraphrased as saying that if it is required that application of the ideas of sufficiency and conditionality never leads to conflicting, or nonequivalent, conclusions then these conclusions have to obey the likelihood principle. But, on the above viewpoint, it is not reasonable to impose such a requirement, and Birnbaum's theorem may be taken as showing that sufficiency and conditionality do not satisfy the requirement.
Even if Kalbfleisch's proposal to start by applying CE is not considered cogent, the distinction between experimental and mathematical ancillaries is likely to be useful. On the matter of which ancillaries are to be taken as experimental, I wonder what Kalbfleisch's attitude would be to Example 1 if our knowledge of the random mechanism implied that f(x) had to be of the form (1), or to the first part of Example 2 if, similarly, it was known that the regression was linear with normal errors. Would this knowledge change the ancillaries in question from mathematical to experimental?
It may be illuminating to consider the further example of the two-by-two table, Table 1 (a), obtained by classifying a random sample of n individuals according to phenotype at two diallelic loci with dominance. Assuming that the population sampled is the offspring of a population consisting entirely of double heterozygotes of trans-type, and that there has been random union of gametes and no selection, the corresponding table of probabilities is that of Table 1 (b), where the parameter 7. is the product of the recombination frequencies for males and females.
The statistics xl and x., are maximal ancillaries, but are they mathematical or experimental, or is this a case which we have to leave undecided? The chance mechanism under study is the recombination process, and it may be argued that the ancillaries have come about through the design of the experiment and that x1. and x.l are therefore experimental ancillaries. Provided xl and x.1 are considered experimental, then we have here a clear cut instance of nonuniqueness of maximal experimental ancillaries, with nothing to choose between xl1 and x.l. And the indication is that if an unequivocal answer of the statistical analysis is, unreasonably, demanded then one is, in effect, forced to obey the likelihood principle.
It may be noted that the minimal sufficient statistic for the original model is obtained by adding x12 and x21, and after this reduction there seems to exist no ancillaries.
